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T
he Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was 
enacted in response to the fact that minority 
and low-income communities were not being 
fairly and adequately served by banks which 
have been beneficiaries of the U.S. government’s safety 
net since the Great Depression. The federal government, 
by expanding its safety net in 2008 to include invest-
ment banks, broker-dealers, and other financial institu-
tions, took the steps necessary to stabilize the global 
financial markets. The central premise of this article is 
that in return for access to the Federal Reserve’s Discount 
Window, investment banks, broker-dealers,1 and other 
financial institutions should be required to comply with 
an updated CRA. Fair access for all Americans to the 
full range of financial services is essential to restore our 
faith in the U.S. financial system and the health of our 
economy. 
When the CRA was enacted in 1977 the fundamental 
principle of the legislation was that banks should provide 
loans and services to the communities from which they 
obtain deposits. Despite great progress, large segments 
of the United States population continue to be under-
served by the financial services industry and do not have 
access to the full range of products and services. This is 
illustrated by the subprime mortgage crisis, which has 
affected people of every ethnicity and income level, 
but has been particularly damaging in low-income and 
minority communities. 
According to an analysis of loans reported under the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, African Americans were 
2.3 times more likely and Hispanics were twice as likely 
as whites to get high-cost loans after adjusting for loan 
amounts and the income of the borrowers. High-cost, 
subprime mortgages are often characterized as loans 
made to people with low credit scores, and therefore 
blemished credit, or little experience with debt. Scant 
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attention has been paid to the concentration of these 
loans in neighborhoods that are largely African Ameri-
can, Hispanic, or both. This pattern of disparate lending 
holds true even when comparing white middle-class 
or upper-income neighborhoods with similar minority 
communities.2 
A recent article in The New York Times highlighted 
this phenomenon in an analysis of two neighboring 
communities in the Detroit metropolitan area: 
One, located in the working-class suburb of Plym-
outh, is 97 percent white with a median income 
of $51,000 in 2000. To the east, a census tract in 
Detroit just inside Eight Mile Road has a very similar 
median income, $49,000, but the population there is 
97 percent black. 
Last year, about 70 percent of the loans made in 
the Detroit neighborhood carried a high interest 
rate — defined as three percentage points more than 
the yield on a comparable Treasury note — while in 
Plymouth just 17 percent did.
It is hard to prove why there is such a disparity be-
tween economically similar neighborhoods, but as the 
article suggests, a good place to start is the “history of 
banks’ avoiding minority neighborhoods, the practice 
known as ‘redlining.’”3
The Changing Financial Services Business
In 1977, financial services in the United States were 
delivered very differently. There were geographic limita-
tions on where banks and thrifts could operate. Consis-
tent with the Glass-Stegall Act, there were restrictions 
on the kinds of business that commercial banks could 
1	 	Broker-dealers	trade	securities	for	their	own	account	and	for	their	customers.
2   Braunstein, Saundra F., Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. 
House of Representatives, “ The Community Reinvestment Act”, February 13, 2008.
3	 	Vikas	Bajaj	and	Ford	Fessenden,	“What’s	Behind	the	Race	Gap?”	The	New	York	Times,	November	4,	2007.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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conduct versus investment banks, broker-dealers, and 
thrifts. Commercial banks took deposits to make per-
sonal and commercial loans. Thrifts took deposits and 
primarily lent people money to purchase homes. Broker-
dealers accepted people’s money to buy stocks and 
bonds. Investment banks accepted investors’ money to 
raise debt and equity for businesses. Financial services 
were a bricks-and-mortar operation where individu-
als and businesses visited their local bank to deposit a 
paycheck, establish a savings account, or get a loan. 
Individuals also went to their local brokerage to invest 
and to the local office of the investment bank to raise 
debt and equity to buy or expand their business. The 
secondary market was relatively undeveloped. It existed 
primarily in the mortgage market where Ginnie Mae 
bought Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Vet-
erans Administration (VA) insured mortgages, packaged 
them into pools and sold them to mortgage bond inves-
tors. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were agencies of the 
federal government that did the same with conventional 
first mortgages.
Over the last 30 years, we have seen the expansion, 
privatization, and subsequent renationalization of Fannie 
and Freddie and unprecedented consolidation in the 
financial services industry. The local bank has become a 
branch of a larger, national bank, and the local banker 
hardly exists anymore. The distinctions that existed in 
the types of products and services that the various types 
of financial institutions can offer have disappeared. The 
Glass-Steagall Act has been virtually repealed, allowing 
for the creation of the financial supermarket where one 
institution can make loans, underwrite debt and equity, 
and sell stocks and bonds. Technological advances such 
as direct deposit for payroll and Internet banking have 
made bricks and mortar less important to large segments 
of more sophisticated customers. According to a 2004 
Michigan Law Review article by Michael Barr, banks and 
thrifts’ share of financial assets has declined dramatically 
since the end of World War II from 60 percent to about 
25 percent.4
Other developments include the advent of 401(k) 
accounts, which has allowed more individual investors 
to be responsible for managing their own retirement 
accounts. And home loans have become increasingly 
complex financial instruments that are bought and sold 
in highly developed secondary markets, severing the 
connection between lender and borrower.
Access to the Federal Safety Net
During the Great Depression, the federal government 
responded to the crisis of confidence experienced by 
depositors with a series of measures including provid-
ing insurance for individual accounts with deposits up 
to $100,000 (now $250,000) and the creation of the 
Discount Window to provide liquidity to commercial 
banks. To ensure that federally insured deposits were 
lent in a prudent manner, commercial banks fell under 
the regulatory oversight of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) and the Federal Reserve. Today, what 
has brought many financial institutions to the brink of 
disaster, was a combination of poor quality loans and 
insufficient equity capital. The capital markets’ increased 
liquidity and a voracious appetite for return allowed 
financial institutions to operate with highly leveraged 
capital structures. When the capital markets broke down, 
these institutions were forced to hold assets on their bal-
ance sheets. They became vulnerable to failure because 
they did not have the equity to support the assets they 
were forced to hold.
Bear Stearns, for example, represents a modern day 
equivalent of a run on a bank. The run was fueled by 
rumors in the markets that there was a liquidity crisis 
at Bear Stearns. The rescue of Bear Stearns was the first 
instance of the Federal Reserve providing access to the 
Discount Window to a non-commercial bank. JPMorgan 
Chase’s subsequent acquisition of Bear Sterns (facilitated 
by a federal guaranty), IndyMac’s failure and takeover 
by the FDIC, and Bank of America’s acquisition of 
Merrill Lynch were precipitated by the market’s loss of 
confidence. 
In another example, Countrywide was a standalone 
mortgage bank, which was thinly capitalized and 
had assets of questionable quality. When faced with 
mounting losses and limited access to liquidity from the 
capital markets, Countrywide ran out of cash and was 
unable to operate independently as a going concern. 
This led to its sale to Bank of America. To stave off a 
similar fate, American Express, Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
4	 	Barr,	Michael	S.	(2004).	“Credit	Where	it	Counts:	The	Community	Reinvestment	Act	and	Its	Critics”	Paper	411,	University	of	 
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Stanley and GMAC (among others) have all pursued 
bank holding company status to gain access to the 
Discount Window and the liquidity safety net it provides. 
This phenomenon, where financial institutions of 
all stripes are looking for government backing, is not 
uniquely American. At the October, 2008 G8 Confer-
ence, European policy makers decided to guaranty the 
performance of their banks and convinced U.S. policy 
makers to do the same. These extraordinary actions by 
the Federal Reserve and by central banks around the 
world were necessary to prevent the collapse of the 
global financial system. In other words, the current 
global financial crisis has precipitated a dramatic expan-
sion of government-backed safety nets. 
The Opportunities Created by Extending 
the CRA to New Financial Institutions
Including investment banks and broker-dealers in the 
CRA should not be seen as a burden. Rather, these institu-
tions could comply with the act in ways that continue to 
focus on their core competencies, while simultaneously 
increasing access to financial expertise and capital for 
low-income, minority, and underserved communities. 
This would certainly be in keeping with the amendments 
made to the CRA in 2005 that expanded its scope to 
disaster areas and underserved rural areas. In the Detroit 
neighborhood mentioned earlier, the financial supermar-
kets could provide multiple choices for people looking for 
home loans. Investment banks could create funds for and 
provide direct investment in businesses owned by low-
income individuals and minorities or businesses located 
in low-income and minority communities. Broker-dealers 
could sell shares in these funds or the actual debt and 
equity securities issued. Investment banks and broker-
dealers could provide training and technical assistance 
for individuals, entrepreneurs and small businesses. They 
could locate facilities in underserved areas, or provide 
sponsorship for charter schools for underserved popula-
tions. Causes such as rebuilding New Orleans after Hur-
ricane Katrina and greater homeownership for low- and 
moderate-income people would be greatly aided by the 
participation of the investment banking community. The 
possibilities for new financial products offered to low-in-
come individuals are only limited by the investment banks 
and broker-dealers’ creativity, ingenuity, and entrepre-
neurial spirit.
It is important to note that most of the loans made by 
depository institutions examined under the CRA have not 
been higher-priced loans, and studies show that the CRA 
has increased the volume of responsible lending to low- 
and moderate-income households.5 It is also significant 
that 50 percent of subprime loans were made by mort-
gage service companies not subject to comprehensive 
federal supervision including the CRA and another 30 
percent were made by affiliates of banks or thrifts which 
are not subject to routine supervision or examinations.6 
For those who believe that in exchange for the safety 
net comes the responsibility to provide fair product and 
service access consistent with safety and soundness, 
then compliance with a proven mechanism like the CRA 
should prevent some of the abuses that we have wit-
nessed in the subprime crisis from reoccurring. 
The genius of the CRA is the flexibility it gives banks 
in how they can comply. In addition, there are meaning-
ful penalties for noncompliance, such as the inability 
to complete mergers and acquisitions among financial 
institutions with less than Satisfactory ratings, and that 
banks’ CRA examinations are made public. Given the 
consolidation in the financial services industry, the 
penalties for noncompliance with the CRA should be re-
vised. One possibility is charging non-compliant institu-
tions penalty rates on loans from the Discount Window. 
Another is charging significant fines as a penalty for 
non-compliant institutions.
Research has shown that the CRA has been successful 
in its original goal of providing fair access to financial 
services by expanding access to credit for low-income, 
moderate-income, and minority households at a rea-
sonable cost. It has offered a better alternative than any 
other similar legislation or government subsidy, and 
compares favorably with alternative forms of regula-
tion.7 In the recent financial crisis, financial institu-
tions covered by the CRA have increased the volume 
5	 	Yellen,	Janet	L.	president	and	CEO,	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	San	Francisco	Opening	Remarks	to	the	2008	National	Interagency	Community	
Reinvestment Conference, March 31, 2008. See also, Traiger & Hinckley LLP, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Welcome Anomaly in the 
Foreclosure	Crisis,	Indications	that	the	CRA	Deterred	Irresponsible	Lending	in	the	15	Most	Populous	U.S.	Metropolitan	Areas,	January	7,	2008.
6   Barr , Michael S., testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, “The Community Reinvestment Act: 
Thirty Years of Accomplishments, But Challenges Remain,” February 13, 2008.
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of responsible lending to low- and moderate-income 
households. Three decades after enactment of the CRA, 
it remains flexible with respect to compliance. The 
break down of the capital markets has caused regulated 
and non-regulated financial institutions to pursue bank 
holding company status in search of the safety and the 
liquidity provided by the Discount Window. The deci-
sion to expand the Federal Reserve’s safety net to include 
investment banks, broker-dealers, and other financial 
institutions has preserved the American financial sys-
tem. With financial institutions like Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs pursuing bank holding company status 
comes the opportunity to make good on the commit-
ment to provide Americans equal access to the full range 
of financial services that the CRA originally promised. 
These institutions that use their creativity and intellectual 
capital to develop the newest, most innovative prod-
ucts for a select few would now, through compliance 
with the CRA, also be required to develop products and 
services for the low-income, minority, and underserved 
markets. Extending the CRA to the same institutions that 
benefit from the safety net would result in the fair access 
for all Americans to the full range of financial services 
that is essential to restoring our faith in the U.S. financial 
system and the health of our economy. 
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